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The Administration shares with Congress a commitment to ensuring the
American people are provided effective protection against the emerging
long-range ballistic missile threat from rogue nations. That is why we
have diligently pursued since 1996 a deployment readiness program to
develop a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system designed to protect
against such threats. The Administration has budgeted $10.5 billion
between Fiscal Years 1999-2005 for this program, including the funds that
would be necessary during this period to deploy a limited NMD system.
Nonetheless, the Administration strongly opposes H.R. 4 as reported for two
key reasons. First, the bill suggests that a decision to deploy an NMD
system has already been made. Second, it does not make clear that the NMD
would be limited and focused on protecting the United States against rogue
state ballistic missile threats, as opposed to a calculated large-scale
attack by an existing nuclear power.
The Administration will consider the deployment question in 2000, based on
a number of critical factors, including those that must be evaluated by the
President as Commander-in-Chief. The Administration intends to base the
deployment decision on an assessment of the technology (based on an initial
series of rigorous flight-tests) and the proposed system's operational
effectiveness. In addition, other factors that will be evaluated are
whether the ballistic missile threat to the United States from rogue
states has developed as quickly as is currently expected and the cost of
deploying an NMD system.
Finally, a decision regarding NMD deployment must also be addressed within
the context of the ABM Treaty and our objectives for achieving future
reductions in strategic offensive arms through START II and START III. The
ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability, and Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin agree that it is of fundamental significance to
achieving the elimination of thousands of strategic nuclear arms under
these treaties.
The Administration has made clear to Russia that deployment of a limited
NMD that requires amendments to the ABM treaty would not in any way
challenge the underlying purpose of the ABM Treaty, i.e., to maintain
strategic stability and enable further reductions in strategic nuclear
arms. The ABM Treaty has been amended before, and the Administration sees
no reason why it should not be possible to modify it again to permit
deployment of an NMD effective against rogue nation ballistic missile
threats.
No other nation shall have a veto over the United States' NMD requirements.
America's sovereign rights are fully protected by the supreme national
interests clause that is an integral part of the ABM Treaty. The
Administration, however, does not believe it should issue ultimatums, and
stands ready to negotiate any necessary amendments to the treaty in good
faith.
H.R. 4 could be read as suggesting that neither the ABM Treaty nor our
objectives for START II and START III are factors in an NMD deployment
decision. Enactment of this legislation could be interpreted by Russia as
evidence that the U.S. is not interested in working towards a cooperative
solution, one that is in both nations' security interests. This would put
at risk a successful negotiation on the ABM Treaty and the hard-won
bipartisan gains of START. Our common goal should be to achieve success in
negotiations on the ABM Treaty while also securing the strategic arms
reductions available through START.
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