APPLIED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT The Administration has designed a strategic approach to applied research and advanced development to get the most out of our defense science and technology investment in an increasingly difficult fiscal environment. The tri-service Defense Technology Area Plan comprehensively describes the investment strategy for critical defense technologies. It identifies the anticipat ed return on the science and technology investment through nearly 200 Defense Technology Objectives in ten broad technology areas. Each Defense Technology Objective identifies a specific technology advance that will be developed or demonstrated, the anticipated date that the technology will be available, and the specific benefits that should result. These benefits not only include increased military operational capabilities, but other important areas as well, including affordability and dual use applications.

NEW WAYS OF DOING BUSINESS To increase the performance and reduce the costs of new defense technologies, the Administration has launched initiatives that reflect new ways of doing business. These new initiatives include policies to strengthen acquisition reform, promote dual-use-technologies, and sharpen technology demonstrations. ACQUISITION REFORM. This initiative removes barriers that sometimes seperate the defense industry from the commercial industry. Thus, it ensures that the military can acquire the highest quality equipment at the lowest cost. For example, acquisition reform initiatives are significantly reducing the cost of improving the precision of munitions. In the Joint Direct Attack Munition program, standard gravity bombs are fitted with guidance kits aided by Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, greatly increasing their accuracy. Changing to a performance-based specification from a military specification (Milspec) made it possible to use lower-cost commercial GPS technology in this application, cutting program cost in half. DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES. The Administration's dual-use technology policy recognizes that our nation can no longer afford to maintain two distinct industrial bases and therefore allows our armed forces to exploit the rapid rate of innovtion of commercial industry to meet defense needs. By taking advantage of the speed of commercial advances, the Department of Defense can better ensure that it will develop, field, and sustain superior equipment in a cost-efficient manner, avoiding the high costs of developing military-specific components unless they are absolutely necessary. The dual-use strategy rests on three pillars: dual-use R&D to exploit the potential of advanced commercial technologies to meet defense needs; integration of commercial and military production to enable industry to "dual"; and insertion of commercial products, processes, and technologies into defense systems wherever possible. This strategy is designed to improve access to leading-edge technology and to reduce the cost of advanced defense capabilities. The Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP), run by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, was the Defense Department's first major dual-use technology program. The TRP awarded nearly $1 Billion during a series of competitions held in 1993-1995. Because industry was required to pay at leasthalf of the cost of every TRP project, the government's investment leveraged several billion dollars of R&D. TRP-supported projects promoted the advance of promising dual-use technologies in a range of critical defense areas, including low-cost night vision, high-density data storage devices, battlefield casualty treatment, composite aircraft structures, and detection of chemical/biological agents. Although no further TRP competitions are planned, the Department of Defense has created the Dual-Use Applications Program which uses lessons learned from the TRP and which is administered by the military services and supports cost-shared technology development with industry that is targeted to each of the Services' needs. In the area of dual-production, the Defense Department's partnerships are already helping develop commercial applications for advanced military technologies as a way to lower costs. For example, several years ago the Defense Department pursued microwave monolithic integrated circuit (MIMIC) technology advanced gallium arsenide semiconductors - as a strictly military development, but the high cost prohibited widespread use of the devices. Defense now encourages MIMIC contractors to pursue commercial applications in uses such as collision avoidance systems for automobiles, satellite communications, and air traffic control signal processing. By leveraging commercial production, the payoff to defense is better radar and other systems at a lower cost. The Department of Defense is pursuing a third dual-use theme - commercial insertion - through programs such as the new Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative and the Commercial Technology Insertion Program to accelerate the use of specific dual-use technologies into weapon systems. For example, civilian contractors are working with Defense Department staff to develop a process for inserting non-military parts into the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System. The broader goal is to develop a corps of "smart buyers" in the military who have a detailed knowledge of relevant commercial technologies and an understanding of commercial markets and buying practices. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS. A third approach through which the Administration is increasing the performance and reducing the costs of new defense technologies is technology demonstrations. The Administration has developed several mechanisms for moving innovative concepts and superior technology from the development laboratory to the field faster and at lower cost than traditional mechanisms. Advanced Technology Demonstrations. Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) seek to demonstrate the maturity and potential of advanced technologies for enhanced military operational capability or cost effectiveness. Examples include Rapid Terrain Visualization - a multi-year effort to integrate technologies for rapid, high resolution digital terrain data generation, dissemination, and display, and integration with intelligence data for battlefield visualization; the Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector to detect metallic and nonmetallic mines at tactical speeds; Integrated Biodetection to fabricate, demonstrate, and integrate point and standoff biodetection technologies into an integrated battlefield detection system; and many others, all designed to directly support the Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) are designed to transfer technology rapidly from the developers to the users. They are user-oriented and represent an integrated effort to assemble and demonstrate a significant, new, or improved military capability that is based on mature advanced technologies. As with the ATDs, all of the ACTDs directly support the Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Warfighting Experiments. Joint Warfighting Experiments are conducted as part of joint warfighting exercises. A Joint Warfighting Experiment is a snapshot in time when prototypes and technologies from ACTDs, ATDs, and technology-base and advanced-development programs are integrated to permit the warfighter to judge their potential and gain insight into future advanced joint warfighting concepts.

COUNTERING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Throughout the Cold War, the United States faced, in the Soviet Union, an adversary armed with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. During that period, the ability of each side to absorb an attack by these weapons and still be capable of responding with a devastating counterattack ensured that neither superpower used these frightful weapons against the other. Today, the United States and Russia are working together to reduce and dismantle the arsenals they built up during the Cold War. However, we face a continuing challenge as these types of advanced weaponry threaten to spread to other states and nonstate actors around the world. At least 20 countries have or may be developing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Terrorist groups have become increasingly capable, often employing lethal, wide-ranging, and sophisticated operating methods and technical expertise. Rogue regimes are seeking to acquire these weapons for blackmail, or as an inexpensive counter to the United States' overwhelming conventional military superiority. Regional rivals may use them against each other in pursuit of a decisive edge in combat, or in anticipation of a feared preemptive strike. In short, those who succeed in acquiring these weapons in the post-Cold War world may not be subject to the restraints against their use that characterized the U.S.-Soviet tensions of the Cold War. The Administration is pursuing a broad range of efforts to reduce existing military threats and stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems. These efforts include new agreements, enhanced cooperation, improved safeguards, and new technologies for monitoring and verification. The United States is expanding its cooperation with the states of the former Soviet Union to dismantle at an accelerated pace the massive arsenals left from the Cold War, to ensure that weapons and weapons materials are secure and accounted for, to ensure the scientifically sound disposition of these materials, and to employ former weapons scientists in needed civilian research. Through cooperation we have also secured agreements from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to send all the nuclear weapons on their soil to Russia where they can be safely controlled and dismantled. We have also achieved an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and have successfully negotiated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Science and technology are fundamental to successful arms control treaty verification and nonproliferation. The Administration's strategy for investing in science and technology to support our nonproliferation and arms control policies focuses on three critical elements: strengthening the technical know-how to conduct effective arms restraint; continually improving detection, monitoring, and verification capabilities; and promoting science and technology cooperation to advance arms reduction and nonproliferation goals. Organizational and personal relationships that have been created through science and technology collaborations also provide an extensive basis that can contribute to arms reduction and nonproliferation. The international scientific community, with its strong ties across many borders, can contribute to an assessment of approaches and can itself act to defuse problem situations. For example, throughout the Cold War, Western scientists and scholars worked with their Soviet counterparts to advance scientific discovery and to build a basis for cooperation in arms reduction and nonproliferation. At times, the lines of communication between scientists were the only lines open when political difficulties constrained formal diplomatic channels. Expanding these professional scientific ties in the post-Soviet era has sustained the Russian scientific community and laid the groundwork for unprecedented cooperation in support of our common nonproliferation goals. The Administration will continue to seek cooperation with the states of the former Soviet Union to ensure that nuclear materials are safe and secure, that the production of weapons plutonium is shutdown, and that stockpiles of nuclear materials are reduced. As President Clinton has stated, the United States will work with Russia to pursue further arms reduction including the possibility of direct controls on nuclear warheads and nuclear materials.

DEFENDING AGAINST TERRORISM The tragedy of terrorism has come closer and closer to home. The United States had long been insulated from large-scale acts of terrorism until the terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassy and on U.S. forces in Lebanon in 1983, and the downing of Pan Am flig ht 103 in 1988, killed hundreds of Americans. With the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 - intended to kill thousands - massive acts of terrorism came to our shores. The chemical attack against Tokyo subway riders in 1995 raised the prospect that weapons far more devastating than conventional explosives were entering terrorist arsenals. Measures to prevent, minimize, and recover from acts of terrorism - whether via conventional, unconventional, or information attack-are essential, and must be undertaken a t all levels, from the local to the international. The Clinton Administration is bringing the full weight of the Federal government to bear against this threat, with science and technology playing a critical role. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, chaired by the Vice President, has highlighted the role advanced technology can play in making flying safer by deploying state-of-the-art explosive detection and other technologies at our nation's airports. Our intelligence and law enforcement agencies are bolstering their tools to uncover and forestall attacks before they can be carried out, and to identify and successfully prosecute those planning or conducting them. A full range of diplomatic and military options is available to respond to states or nonstate groups that aid terrorist attacks on the United States. Countermeasures against new types of weapons are being readied, including developing and deploying means for managing the consequences of a chemical or biological attack - detecting the presence of chemical and biological agents, protecting public safety personnel, treating victims who have been exposed to such agents, and decontaminating affected environments afterwards. Measures to protect our armed forces overseas against such attacks can bolster our ability to respond to terrorist attacks at home. For example, the recently created Marine Corps' Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, the only U.S. force currently capable of performing large-scale consequence management activities in a ch emical/biological contaminated environment, can be rapidly deployed at foreign or U.S. locations. We will also counter threats, whether by computer-based attack or more conventional means, from those who would attack our critical infrastructure - the telecom munications, banking, and finance sys tems; electrical power, gas, and water distribution systems; emergency services; and continuity of government systems upon which our society depends. The President has recently created a Critical Infrastructure Protection Commission and charged it with recommending a comprehensive national policy and implementation strategy for protecting our infrastructure and assuring its continued operation.

MOBILIZING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR GLOBAL STABILITY AND PROSPERITY As one member of a global community, the United States shares with the world common threats and challenges to sustained economic development. Environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, natural disasters, and disease can have major consequences that threaten every nation. The rapid growth of the world's population, projected to increase by up to one billion each decade, exacerbates many of these dilemmas. History has shown that population pressures can offset economic growth, lead to unsustainable demands on food, other resources and the environment, and contribute to disorder and mass dislocations. These pressures threaten global stability and security and are likely only to grow more pressing with the passing of time. Scientific research and monitoring underlie our ability to respond to many of these challenges. Global surveillance and basic biomedical research are key to dealing with emerging and re-emerging inf ectious diseases. Science and technology can also affect population stabilization through education, planning, reproductive health care, and better methods of contraception; food security through increased agricultural productivity and improved food preservation, storage, and distribution; resource stewardship through research that strengthens the sustainable management of temperate and tropical forests, and coastal and marine resources; natural disaster reduction through developing and implementing technologies for both monitoring and mitigation; and the promotion of knowledge about options that support sustainable development. International networks of scientists and engineers provide an important resource in addressing these varied issues. In addition, science and technology play an essential role in helping societies recover from the devastation and dangers that are left by conflict. For example, new technologies are playing a life-s aving role in enabling the more effective and efficient removal of landmines that threaten the sustainable development of many fragile societies. The challenge is daunting but the need for solutions is critical.

STRENGTHENING OUR INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC TIES The Administration's strategy for applying science and technology to meet these challenges builds upon the strengths of preventive diplomacy, strategic engagement and international partnerships. Through preventive diplomacy, the Administration endeavors to resolve problems, reduce tensions, and defuse conflicts before they become crises. Employing science and technology to bolster preventive diplomacy adds a new dimension to our arsenal to promote stability and security. The President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) has stressed the importance of this approach, noting that "what is required is a shift in thinking akin to the change of emphasis in medicine from emergency rooms and intensive care units to preventive primary care and public health." Through strategic engagement and international partnerships, the Administration strives to provide the framework for promoting sustainable development, addressing global threats and large-scale problems, and strengthening the economic ties that underlie global stability. These are instruments of preventive diplomacy that are made more powerful through science and technology. For example, the Administration has elevated environmental issues to a high priority in U.S. foreign policy and is intensifying strategic international initiatives because it is clear that a global response is essential to addressing major environmental challenges. Cooperation in science and technology has been of great value in responding to international disasters and human tragedies. Volcano Disaster Assistance Program and Rabaul Volcano Observatory personnel installed volcano-monitoring instruments near the erupting Tavurvur volcano in Papua New Guinea. Fifty thousand people were successfully evacuated before the simultaneous eruption of two volcanos. With these instruments, scientists predicted the eruptions and provided information about when it was safe to return. International cooperation in science and technology is also a means of more effectively achieving our national goals. For example, to more effectively mitigate the impacts of natural disasters, cooperation is invaluable. Although disasters are somewhat rare locally, they are common globally. Therefore cooperation yields valuable information and is a positive sum strategy for all nations. Cooperation can be used to accelerate the development of new technologies, data, and monitoring systems; reduce the costs of achieving needed advances or of gathering needed knowledge; pave the way for trade between U.S. manufacturers and international users; and mitigate the damage to facilities and capabilities overseas in which the United States has interests. FOSTERING GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS The Administration continues to work with other nations to build the framework through which cooperation in science and technology can strengthen our ability to stem global threats, foster sustainable development, and advance areas of mutual interest. The Administration has promoted the development of platforms for engagement through bilateral commissions with nations including Russia, China, Ukraine, South Africa, and Egypt; through priority bilateral science and technology cooperation with key partners, including Japan and the European Union; and through multilateral forums such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and Summit of Americas. These arrangements facilitate a constant dialogue among science and technology policymakers, provide a steady framework to promote and protect U.S. interests abroad, apply science and technology more aggressively to meet our foreign policy priorities, and advance the frontiers of knowledge by drawing on a greater range of resources. Strategic engagement and international partnerships underlie our ability to incorporate science and technology into our foreign policy goals. Through binational commissions and partnerships, the Administration can more effectively address a range of priorities with our international partners. One example is the U.S-Russian Commission which, in three years, has facilitated numerous collaborations in all fields of science and technology, including a recently established energy efficiency partnership to promote U.S. technology exports and help Russia reduce pollution emissions. Working through the Commission, the United States established a new foundation to support civilian R&D collaboration between scientists in the United States and scientists in the states of the former Soviet Union. Another example is the U.S.-Japan Common Agenda. Since its inception in 1993, partnerships have been formed and strengthened in over 24 areas, all of which contribute to sustainable development and the mitigation of common threats. One example is the enhanced partnership in earthquake disaster reduction to promote science and technology advances that will lead to safer communities. In our relationship with China, there have been over 1,000 official bilateral projects involving the exchange of over 10,000 people. Through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum the United States has a framework for working with the fastest growing economies in the world. Since President Clinton convened the first meeting of APEC leaders in 1993, United States engagement in this forum has made important strides in promoting sustainable development. At the first Science and Technology Ministerial in 1995, Ministers - with U.S. leadership - agreed to collaborate on challenges in the environment, natural disasters, and human health. In 1996, the United States supported a focus on challenges to human resource development in science and technology in the APEC region and led in forming the APEC Cleaner Production/Clean Technology Strategy. In Africa, the Administration is working with 21 sub-Saharan nations to extend the benefits of the Global Information Infrastructure. Through the recently created Leland Initiative, the U.S. Agency for International Development is fostering the use of telematic technologies - in which U.S. firms are world leaders - to overcome barriers to sustainable development. This initiative will harness the powerful information and communication tools of the Internet to address challenges such as disease, literacy, environmental protection, and private sector development. The Administration has also promoted the use of science and technology by working closely with various global organizations. We have worked with the World Health Organization to successfully eradicate smallpox, and are working to combat the threat of emerging infectious diseases. The Administration's policy to fight emerging infectious diseases seeks to make needed improvements in the international and domestic capabilities for surveillance, prevention, and response to these growing global health threats. We are drawing upon provisions of the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention to gain greater access to marine research data vital to managing ocean resources and understanding global change. And we have worked with the U.N. Population Summit in Cairo to strengthen science and technology support for more effective family planning. Through various bilateral and multilateral organizations, the Administration also is seeking to strengthen free markets and integrate other nations into a larger, more open economic order. Studies have shown that economic linkages with the international community and the world system of trade enhance the stability of developing nations and nations in transition to democracy. We pursue these objectives by promoting United States science and technology cooperation, trade with established trading partners, and investments in economies in transition. Finally, we will continue to work with nongovernmental organizations and industry to achieve these goals in an effective manner. At our urging, the multilateral development banks are now placing increased emphasis upon sustainable development in their funding decisions. This priority heightens awareness of technological options for more environmentally sound development. In particular, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), established in 1994, will provide a source of financial assistance to the developing world for climate change, biodiversity, and oceans initiatives.

MAINTAINING THE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS For over 50 years since the United States detonated the world's first nuclear weapon in the New Mexico desert, weapons designers have relied first on atmospheric testing, and later on nuclear tests conducted underground, to verify the performance of nuclear weapons and to develop new designs. Paramount was the need to ensure that the weapons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal were reliable (would work as intended in a hostile war environment) and safe (could not be set off accidentally). This approach to maintaining the nuclear stockpile ended on September 24, 1996, the day President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This treaty, the longest sought, hardest fought prize of the arms control process, prohibits nuclear weapons testing, thus ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. The President signed the CTBT confident that the nation's nuclear stockpile would remain safe and reliable without nuclear testing. Indeed, he conditioned U.S. participation in the treaty on maintaining such confidence. At his direction, the Department of Energy initiated the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) Program, a new approach to maintaining the safety and reliability of the stockpile. Science has always been integral to our understanding of nuclear weapons. Without nuclear testing, stockpile maintenance will rely more than ever on science. For the past 50 years, the nuclear weapons stockpile has been maintained through a strategy of surveillance, nuclear and nonnuclear testing, scientific investigation, and continual replacement of old warheads with new designs. Today, we are no longer producing new kinds of weapons, and scientists must capture in other ways the types of information they formerly gathered through nuclear testing. Scientists and engineers will use new and enhanced experimental and computational facilities, including sophisticated computer models, neutron beams, and laser beams focused on tiny hydrogen pellets to ensure the safety and reliability of the stockpile. This program will not enable scientists to develop new kinds of weapons, which is too difficult a task without nuclear testing. It will allow the President to remain confident in the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The technical basis for the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile rests on a program of surveillance to examine and diagnose aging phenomena in stockpile weapons and materials; assessment and analysis of the physical observations through detailed calculations and experiments to test these observations; and necessary responses to any changes. The success of the program also depends on our ability to maintain a cadre of scientists with the expertise and flexibility to address unforeseen future stockpile issues as they arise. As the stockpile ages, scientists must be able to predict with confidence when a change observed in a stockpile weapon will affect its reliability or safety. To meet military requirements, the Department of Energy must be able to refabricate and certify these weapons. Such confidence will be gained through improved computational capabilities for modeling and simulation; through investments in specific new experimental capabilities to benchmark and validate computational models; and by expanding our most fundamental knowledge of materials at the atomic level. These elements, together with a small, efficient production capability, comprise the SBSS Program. To ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing, the Department of Energy's national security laboratories ( Los Alamos, Sandia, and Livermore) will build new scientific and computer facilities. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Livermore will be the world's most powerful laser and will produce nuclear fusion reactions in small target pellets. NIF experiments will sustain confidence in the aging stockpile as well as open up new areas of basic science and inertial fusion. The target chamber shown here is for Nova, the Livermore laser facility now in operation. Its fusion targets, about the size of grains of sand, reach temperatures and pressures comparable to the center of the Sun when bombarded by Nova's laser. One of the new tools of SBSS will be high-performance computing to validate and certify the safety, reliability, and performance of nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear testing. This will require a ten-thousand fold increase in computing power. Another major SBSS thrust will be the use of experimental facilities such as the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center to probe materials with beams of neutrons, developing a new understanding of the behavior of materials as they age. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) will provide another valuable tool for scientists. This massive laser will focus energy on tiny experimental pellets, producing temperatures, pressures, and densities similar to those occurring during the detonation of a nuclear weapon. This tool will enable scientists in the weapons program to delve into important physical phenomenona of importance to nuclear weapons, but in the laboratory, not through nuclear testing. Through science-based stockpile stewardship and management, the United States will ensure that the activities needed to maintain its nuclear deterrent remain fully compatible with its nonproliferation and arms control objectives, with the added benefit of advancing this nation's scientific knowledge base and technological capability.

NEW EYES IN THE SKY Few applications of defense technology are as revolutionary as the successful integration of information systems, flight vehicle design and control, aerodynamics, propulsion, structures, sensors, and computers represented by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). UAVs have applications in a wide range of military missions, including high-risk missions such as suppressing enemy air defenses and assessing bomb damage, and those requiring long endurance such as reconnaissance and communications relay. Information is power. The Administration's goals is to continue advances in reconnaissance and information technology to support military operations. A Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle flies above the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in a simulated Navy aerial reconnaissance flight. For example, the Predator - a medium altitude, long endurance UAV - has seen operational use in Bosnia while still in the prototype stage. The submarine and special forces communities recently completed a very successful demonstration with the Predator, linking submarines into the larger battlefield command and control system. This demonstration, conducted with Navy SEALs off San Clemente Island, California in June 1996, had the Navy attack submarine USS CHICAGO take control of a Predator UAV from a range of about 100 miles while submerged at periscope depth. In this scenario, a special forces team would conduct its ingress and egress while the orbiting Predator monitored for hostile forces, relaying its observations back instantaneously. In effect, the Predator extended the sub's periscope from 15 feet to 15,000 feet, leading some in the submarine community to comment that "this is the most exciting thing that has happened in submarine warfare since the nuclear reactor."

MOVING TECHNOLOGIES TO THE FIELD MORE EFFICIENTLY The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program is the Administration's approach to capturing and harnessing innovation for military use rapidly and at a reduced cost. ACTDs are desinged to foster an alliance directly between the technologists and the operational users, eliminating barriers that can crop up between the two. Representatives of the forces, including the Joint Staff, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, play a direct role in the selection and management of the ACTDs. ACTDs are focused on four principal objectives: (1) to gain an operator's understanding and evaluation of the military utility of new technology applications before committing to acquisition; (2) to develop corresponding concepts of operation and doctrine that make the best use of the new capability; (3) to provide residual operational capability to the forces; and (4) to facilitate a more informed acquisition decision. The intent of the ACTD process is to provide the user with a mechanism to interact very early in development. Such participation enables rapid and cost-effective evaluation and, if warranted, introduction of new capabilities to operational forces. Examples include the Counterproliferation-Counterforce ACTD which develops weapon employment tactics, damage assessment, and collateral effects tools and integrates them to provide the warfighter a rapid, lethal targeting methodology against chemical and biological weapons production and storage facilities with minimal collateral effects; and the Joint Combat Identification ACTD which will demonstrate a joint, integrated air-to-ground and ground-to-air combat identification capability to increase combat effectiveness and reduce the potential for fratricide. Other examples of ACTDs include unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missle defense, mine countermeasures, advanced joint planning, and synthetic theater of war. Additional demonstrations are planned for combat identification, airbase/port biological defense, miniature air launched decoy, semi-automated imagery processing, and others.

COOPERATION TO CONTROL FISSILE MATERIALS Security for plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) - essential ingredients of nuclear weapons - is improving in the former Soviet Union as a result of ongoing cooperation between Russian and American scientists. With enough of either of these materials in hand, many nations and even some terrorist groups could potentially make a crude nuclear weapon. A soda-can sized block of plutonium weighing only a few kilograms is potentially enough for a nuclear bomb. Thus, nothing is more vital to United States security than ensuring that these materials do not fall into the wrong hands. Unfortunately, in the turmoil that has followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, controls over nuclear materials in some of the states of the former Soviet Union have weakened considerably. Already, there have been several seizures of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable materials stolen from former Soviet nuclear sites. To address this urgent security threat, the United States is working closely with the states of the former Soviet Union to install modern systems that account for and safeguard nuclear materials that could be used in weapons. These systems are the products of U.S.-funded R&D over the past 30 years. They form the basis for a comprehensive plan under which, assuming continued Russian cooperation and Congressional funding, all of the plutonium and HEU in the former Soviet Union will be safeguarded by modern security and accounting systems by the end of the year 2002. At some sites, the process is well under way. At the Sosny Research Center near Minsk, for example, fuel rods containing HEU - easy enough to handle and walk away with - are used to support reactor operations. The research under way is largely for nuclear power-related activities. After the Chernobyl accident and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, civilian research activities at Sosny were significantly curtailed, leaving the facility without military-style security. Until recently, there were no electronic monitors at the gate to detect material being carried out the door - and there was no accurate accounting of how many fuel rods there were, so no one could be sure if any were missing. Major contributions to U.S. security result from enhancing the security of nuclear material in the states of the former Soviet Union through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (also called the Nunn-Lugar program). Shown here is the Fresh Fuel Storage Building at the Sosny Research Center in Minsk, Belarus before and after security enhancements in October 1996. Today at this site, security for the materials is greatly improved. All doors and windows into buildings containing weapons grade nuclear materials have been sealed or alarmed. The front entry doors to these buildings are now accessible only through turnstiles equipped with electronically activated locking mechanisms. In addition, these buildings now have entry control systems that use secure card systems, personal identification numbers, and administrative controls. If an intruder or unauthorized person attempts to enter restricted areas through a fence, gate or door, an alarm will be triggered and transmitted to the central alarm station. In short, today it would be impossible to steal these controlled materials without detection and response. Throughout the former Soviet Union, U.S. scientists have been working closely with their counterparts to make similar security improvements elsewhere. Over the last two years, this effort has grown from protecting kilograms of nuclear material at a few isolated sites to protecting tens of tons at dozens of sites. New regulations and monitoring procedures are also being established, and the former Soviet states are themselves beginning to produce the needed equipment. U.S. and former Soviet scientists are applying the best technologies from each country to solve security problems that affect us all. This effort has received strong bipartisan support. In fact, in 1996, Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici - a Democrat and two Republicans - sponsored legislation in this area that won unanimous Senate approval. The new law significantly increases funding for these programs and supports related efforts to stop nuclear smuggling, end plutonium production, eliminate stockpiles of material at risk, and improve our domestic preparedness to deal with the threat of mass-destruction terrorism. These programs show how early investment in prevention, applying the tools of science and technology, can benefit U.S. security and head off much larger costs and risks in the future.

COUNTERTERRORIST TECHNOLOGIES To meet the growing challenge of terrorist threats, the Administration is drawing on science and technology resources across the Federal government. Individual agencies develop counterterrorism technologies in pursuit of their respective missions, and an interagency body - the Technical Support Working Group - identifies needs, seeks common approaches, and coordinates the development of new technologies to counter terrorism. Significant accomplishments have been made within the past two years: Advanced bomb-detection technologies are being tested at selected airports, with additional deployments recommended by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and ordered by the President. A Nuclear Material Detection System to detect shielded and unshielded special nuclear materials has been fielded, in both stationary and van-portable models, in international airports in the United States and overseas. The first of several working enzymes for use in a decontamination foam for certain chemical weapons agents has been delivered to the U.S. Army's Technical Escort Unit, which is available to respond to incidents of terrorism involving chemical weapons. A Chemical/Biological Explosive Ordnance Disposal Suit, developed jointly with Canada and fielded with the U.S. Army's Technical Escort Unit, provides blast and contaminant protection to the wearer as well as a helmet-mounted communications system. A Mechanical Car Bomb Extractor, an all-terrain robotic system integrating a robust cutting system and video camera, allows law enforcement personnel to gain access remotely to a suspect vehicle and ascertain its contents. This system is commercially available and is used by the FBI. Additional projects under way include research and development of countermeasures to disable large vehicle (van, panel truck, or tractor-trailer) bombs; chemical detection and protective equipment for police, fire, and rescue personnel, and improved forensic tools for DNA and fingerprint recovery. The U.S. government is also cooperating with other nations in counterterrorist technology development to enhance the research efforts of both the United States and participating nations. Terrorism is a common enemy that can be defeated using shared resources and expertise. As new terrorist threats develop, new countermeasures must be developed as well. This explosive ordnance disposal suit, developed jointly by the interagency Technical Support Working Group and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, protects against hazardous chemical or biological agents as well as blast effects.

SAFEGUARDING THE NUCLEAR MATERIALS CYCLE The United States and the international community face the increasingly pressing challenge of managing the flow of nuclear materials from cradle to grave. Building on our work in the handling and disposition of nuclear weapon materials, both at home and with the states of the former Soviet Union, we must address all sources of nuclear materials, from power plants to dismantled nuclear weapons. We are working with Russia to shut down its reactors that continue to produce weapons-grade plutonium so that they can be converted to a safer, non-weapons grade configuration that still would generate electricity. We also are buying highly enriched uranium from Russia that is blended down for use in U.S. power reactors. At the same time, the Administration discourages the civil use of plutonium and thus does not reprocess spent nuclear fuel to recover plutonium. Policies need to ensure that the management and disposal of nuclear material (weapons grade and civilian waste) is addressed at all stages in a coordinated manner. We seek to ensure that strict nonproliferation safeguards are built into all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and that these materials are kept under strict and responsible control. To ensure safe management of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, we are developing a comprehensive, "cradle-to-grave" plan for management and disposal of civilian and military nuclear waste that is consistent with our energy, environment and nonproliferation objectives. This will better ensure that the storage of civilian nuclear waste, from the moment it leaves its reactors to its final placement in a permanent repository, fully meets these objectives.

DEFUSING EXPLOSIVE THREATS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Today, an estimated 80 to 110 million landmines remain in places that were once sites of conflict, killing and maiming more than 25,000 individuals per year. In addition to their costs in terms of human suffering, landmines obstruct economic development programs and keep refugees from returning to their homelands. Entire regions are denied basic services because repairs to infrastructure are impeded, humanitarian aid shipments are disrupted, and societies are thrown into chaos. The vast majority of these landmines remain active for decades, leaving a deadly legacy of conflicts that have long since ceased. According to the United Nations, only some 80,000 mines were extracted in 1993, while an estimated 2.5 million more were laid. Mines that cost as little as $3 on the open market can cost up to $1,000 to clear. Therefore, new demining technologies and procedures are required. In May 1996, the President announced an antipersonnel landmine policy that sets out a concrete path to a global ban on antipersonnel landmines and works to protect civilians in affected areas from those mines that have already been laid. This policy directs the Department of Defense to "undertake a substantial program to develop improved mine detection and clearing technology and to share this improved technology with the broader international community." DOD is also directed to "significantly expand its humanitarian demining program to train and assist other countries in developing effective demining programs." The Humanitarian Demining Program within the DOD is developing technologies and building prototypes for a wide variety of approaches to mine detection, neutralization, and removal, ranging from "weed-whackers" with extra-long handles that can clear the vegetation above suspected mines safely, to integrated, sensor-fused, thermal imaging sensors, metal detectors, and ground-penetrating radars that can detect mines directly or the disturbed soil conditions that indicate their presence. This program works closely with demining efforts in the field, supplying prototype equipment as soon as it is developed, and getting feedback from users to develop further improvements. Items deployed include specially trained mine-detecting dogs, tele-operated miniature flails, computer-aided training modules, and worldwide mine databases. The United States is deploying mine detectors, flails, and explosive foams (used for destroying mines in place) to Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, the first non-governmental purchase of equipment developed under this program is being made by a relief organization for use in Cambodia.

SHORING UP SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRACY Under the leadership of Vice President Gore, the United States is cooperating with South Africa in science and technology for mutual gain. Through our science and technology relationship, we are helping the new South Africa achieve its development goals of an adequate food supply, access to basic health care for all, and a stronger science and technology base. The United States is meeting its foreign policy objectives of building a stronger, more stable, and prosperous South Africa, which can serve as a foundation for democracy in the region. Moreover, science and technology cooperation will allow U.S. scientists to access important scientific data and will expand markets in South Africa for U.S. technologies by promoting joint technology development and creating a technologically literate South African workforce. To achieve these goals, the U.S. government has set up joint programs in climate research, biomedical research, teacher training, agricultural technology, and basic sciences. The U.S. Department of Commerce's National Institute for Standards and Technology has also initiated a cooperative program in standards and metrology, which is critical to opening South African markets to U.S. high-tech products. Another example is the collaboration between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency and the South African Weather Bureau to track the climate phenomenon known as El Nino. This collaboration has already enabled scientists to predict drought up to a year in advance, allowing farmers to plant crops that will survive dry conditions, thereby assuring reliable food production and stable rural economies. Predicting El Nino has important health implications, as well, because the heavy rains associated with it can lead to outbreaks of malaria. Finally, the training component of the joint program will create a new generation of South African climatologists.

COMBATING EBOLA HEMORRHAGIC FEVER On May 6, 1995, the U.S. Embassy in Zaire learned that Kikwit, an area about 350 miles from Kinshasa, was suffering an outbreak of an unusual hemorrhagic fever that had taken the lives of two Italian nuns. Several days later, researchers at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) bio-safety level-four laboratory in Atlanta, Georgia, confirmed that the mysterious outbreak was caused by the deadly Ebola virus. First recognized in 19 76 during parallel outbreaks in the Sudan and Zaire, Ebola has no known treatment or cure. Before the Kikwit outbreak had run its course, 249 people died, nearly one quarter of them health care workers. The Kikwit outbreak, like the few others documented, took off because of poor sanitation, close contact between family care givers and the patients that facilitated exchange of bodily fluids, and reuse in hospitals of syringes and needles. At the invitation of the Zairian government, the World Health Organization (WHO), CDC, and other international relief agencies sent personnel to Kikwit to work with Zairian doctors, and to help contain the outbreak and trace its source. The U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance provided disposable protective clothing, plasma, body bags, and essential medicines. Identifying a deadly disease at its earliest stages is critical to preventing an epidemic. The United States is making worldwide infectious disease detection and control a national priority. A scientist at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Maximum Containment Laboratory processes human samples from an outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever in Kikwit, Zaire. The ability to identify a disease at its earliest stages is critical to preventing an epidemic. Only four highly secure facilities (one in France, one in South Africa, and the U.S. high-containment laboratories at the CDC in Atlanta, Georgia and at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Ft. Detrick, Maryland), are equipped to identify the virus. This means that an outbreak can fester for months before it is recognized, the probable cause pinpointed, and samples are sent for testing and identification. This was precisely the situation in Kikwit, where the first Ebola case probably occurred as early as December 1994 but did not come to the attention of the international community until five months later. Researchers lack two essential pieces of knowledge: how to save the victims, and where the virus resides, or continues to survive, between outbreaks. The latter question in particular is a topic of concentrated effort as researchers probe the jungles to collect and examine tens of thousands of plants and animals. The underlying assumption is that an unknown species serves as a reservoir for the virus. Once researchers understand how the disease is transmitted between this reservoir host species and humans, they can work to interrupt or eliminate transmission. This view of an Ebola virus cluster is from a negative stain electron micrograph, computer-processed image. At the same time, researchers report rapid progress in understanding the course of the disease, and its molecular nature. In addition, a new skin test developed by CDC scientists offers a safe way to send skin samples from remote areas for identification in the high-security labs in the United States, France, and South Africa. Researchers are also exploring modes of transmission, including whether airborne droplets can spread the infection, and are evaluating prospects for a vaccine. Scientists at the Department of Defense have developed animal models of Ebola infection for use in evaluating experimental therapies. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases scientists are ass isting them with the identification of experimental drugs to test. Addressing the challenge of diseases like Ebola requires a global strategy as most cities are within a 36-hour commercial flight of each other - less than the incubation period of many infectious diseases. In June 1996, Vice President Gore announced a new Presidential policy calling for a coordinated strategy of basic research, training, public health programs, foreign assistance, and security measures. Internationally, the United States will work with multilateral organizations and other countries to improve worldwide disease surveillance, reporting, and response, while encouraging other countries to make infectious disease detection and control national priorities. The ultimate goal of the strategy is to create a worldwide surveillance and response network that will protect the future health and well-being of the United States and the global community.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SELECTED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ACCOMPLISHMENTS A STRONGER DEFENSE Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security National Ignition Facility Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative Dual-track tritium strategy Laser techniques for igniting energetic materials "Canary-on-a-chip" detector for chemical or toxin warfare agents DOD High Level Architecture for Modeling and Simulation Super-resolution technique for advanced synthetic aperture radar imagery Systems to locate snipers acoustically ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Counterproliferation Initiative Materials Protection, Control and Accountability activities International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group Technologies to monitor and verify a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Revolutionary terrain elevation mapping techniques Five-year science and technology agreement with Kazakstan Research to counter nuclear smuggling Remote detection of chemical effluents using laser technology Long-term storage and disposition plan for excess weapons-grade plutonium Demonstrations of surplus weapons plutonium disposition technologies with Russia Disposal of excess weapons highly enriched uranium GLOBAL STABILITY AND PROSPERITY National and international strategy to address emerging infectious disease threats Detection and response to cryptosporidiosis, hantavirus, Ebola virus,and pneumonic plague outbreaks S&T Initiatives under the Gore-Chernomyrdin (U.S.-Russia) Commission U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation Expanded cooperation in priority science and technology fields S&T Initiatives under the Gore-Mbeki (U.S.-South Africa) Commission Prediction of the impact of El Ni-o on agricultural production and health Launch of South African student-built microsatellite by NASA S&T Initiatives under the Gore-Mubarek (U.S.-Egypt) Commission Remote sensing for more efficient water management Manufacturing extension S&T Initiatives under the Gore-Kuchma (U.S.-Ukraine) Commission Policy level forum to promote expanded cooperation U.S.-Japan Common Agenda for Cooperation in a Global Perspective Partnerships in Natural Disaster Reduction and Earth Observation Civil Industrial Technology partnerships U.S.-China Cooperation in Science and Technology Expanded cooperation in priority science and technology fields, particularly in topics related to sustainable development APEC Science and Technology Ministerial Cleaner Production/Clean Technology Initiative APEC Science and Technology Internet resources Summit of Americas Science and Technology Ministerial Policy level forum to promote expanded cooperation in information technologies, capacity building, and sustainable development. OECD Megascience Forum Expanded cooperation in neutron sources, bioinformatics, and nuclear physics Facilitated international cooperation in large science projects.

President and First Lady | Vice President and Mrs. Gore
Record of Progress | The Briefing Room
Gateway to Government | Contacting the White House
White House for Kids | White House History
White House Tours | Help | Text Only

Privacy Statement