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Controlling Arms and Stemming the Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction
A critical priority for the United States is to stem the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and
their missile delivery systems. Countries' weapons programs, and their levels
of cooperation with our nonproliferation efforts, will be among our most
important criteria in judging the nature of our bilateral relations.... Arms
control can help reduce incentives to initiate attack; enhance predictability
regarding the size and structure of forces, thus reducing fear of aggresive
intent; reduce the size of national defense industry establishments and thus
permit the growth of more vital, nonmilitary industries; ensure confidence in
compliance through effective monitoring and verification; and, ultimately,
contribute to a more stable and calculable balance of power.
- A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995
Arms control and nonproliferation measures are an integral part
of U.S. security strategy. These measures, designed to reduce existing military
threats and prevent new ones from arising, are an essential complement to our
military programs to respond to such threats, allowing the United States to
maintain greater security at lower cost. Today, as a result of arms reduction
and nonproliferation measures already undertaken, thousands of nuclear warheads
once aimed at the United States have been removed from their launchers and
shipped to dismantlement plants, and a wide range of countries are not armed
with weapons of mass destruction that might otherwise have acquired such
weapons. The Clinton Administration is committed to seizing the opportunities
of the post-Cold War period-and responding to its dangers-by building a still
broader and more effective international arms reduction and nonproliferation
regime. In that effort, science and technology (S&T) will be critical.
The Arms Control and Nonproliferation Imperative
Ever since Bernard Baruch presented the U.S. plan for international
control of atomic power as a choice "between the quick and the dead," the U.S.
Government has recognized the fundamental importance of limiting the threats
posed by weapons of mass destruction and other advanced weaponry. The United
States seeks stabilizing reductions in nuclear arms and arms limitations and
confidence-building measures that contribute to global and regional security.
We seek to prevent additional countries from acquiring chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons and their missile delivery systems and to promote restraint
in transfers of conventional arms that may be destabilizing or dangerous to
international peace.
With the end of the Cold War, these efforts have become even more
essential-and even more complex. The end of Cold War confrontation has enabled
historic reductions in nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, and
the specter of nuclear annihilation has receded dramatically. At the same time,
political fragmentation and economic disarray in the former Soviet Union, along
with the worldwide diffusion of technology, raise new proliferation risks and
complications for arms control.
Despite the large-scale arms reductions now under way, nuclear weapons
remain a central threat to U.S. security. Russia is expected to maintain a
formidable nuclear force with thousands of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable
future. Britain, France, and China also acknowledge having substantial nuclear
forces, and Israel, India, and Pakistan are believed to have nuclear weapons or
the capability to assemble them very rapidly.
All told, some twenty nations have or are seeking weapons of mass
destruction, and many are also seeking the missiles to deliver them. In
addition, a wide range of nations have significant conventional arsenals that
could pose threats to regional security. Limiting these threats, to the extent
possible, is a top national security priority.
Nuclear weapons, offering the possibility of destroying an entire city
instantaneously with a single bomb, pose a particularly devastating threat. The
primary technical barrier limiting the spread of nuclear weapons is limits on
access to the nuclear materials needed to make them-plutonium or highly
enriched uranium (HEU), both of which require a significant technical effort to
produce. Hence, the rising incidence of nuclear smuggling poses an urgent
proliferation threat that must be addressed. Unfortunately, chemical and
biological weapons are also within the reach of many nations, subnational
groups, and even terrorists. Chemical weapons, including nerve gas, blister and
blood agents, and others, require significantly less technical sophistication
to produce and employ than nuclear weapons. Because chemical protective
equipment is highly effective, chemical weapons are most effective against
civilians or unprepared troops. The quantities of chemical agent required are
relatively small when compared to industrial production of similar commercial
chemicals, raising significant complications for control and detection.
Biological weapons-which include both living organisms such as bacteria and
viruses and the poisons they produce, known as toxins-can also pose a
devastating threat and are difficult to detect, either on the battlefield or in
production. Like chemical weapons, biological weapons are easier to acquire
than nuclear arms. Today, genetic engineering and other new technologies offer
new ways to produce dangerous organisms and toxins.
Controlling technologies and materials for weapons of mass
destruction is complicated by the fact that a significant fraction of the
technology and much of the equipment required for a weapons program is "dual
use," with both military and civilian applications. Peaceful nuclear power
programs, for example, can provide part of the infrastructure and expertise
needed for establishing a nuclear weapons program. Electronic devices used to
trigger nuclear bombs are also used in oil exploration. Chemicals used to make
nerve agents are also used to make plastics and to process foodstuffs, and
facilities producing pesticides, insecticides, and fire-retardant chemicals
could be modified to produce chemical agents. A modern pharmaceutical industry
could potentially provide the facilities and expertise needed to produce
biological warfare agents. High-speed computers used for everything from
climate modeling to designing airliners can also be used to design nuclear
bombs. High technologies are increasingly difficult to control, due to advances
in global scientific literacy and the worldwide mobility of people and
information.
Given these realities, arms control and nonproliferation efforts must be
firmly based in the technical realities of a broad spectrum of modern
technologies. It is essential to focus efforts on key restraints that will
genuinely constrain military threats to U.S. and international security while
ensuring that the United States and its allies can maintain the robust defense
forces they need and allowing trade in key civilian technologies that are the
engines of economic growth.
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