T H E   W H I T E   H O U S E

Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (11/9/00)

Help Site Map Text Only

                              THE WHITE HOUSE

                       Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release                          November 9, 2000

                      AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

                                 November 9, 2000

Dear Mr. Speaker:   (Dear Mr. President:)

On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass destruction" --
WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order
12938, declaring a national emergency under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).  Under section 202(d) of the
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national emergency
terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration  unless, within the
90-day period prior to each anniversary date, I publish in the Federal
Register and transmit to the Congress a notice stating that such emergency
is to continue in effect.  The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and their means of delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States.  I am, therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 1995; November
12, 1996; November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; and November 10, 1999, must
continue in effect beyond November 14, 2000.  Accordingly, I have extended
the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938, as amended.

The following report is made pursuant to section 204(c) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and section
401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)).  It reports
actions taken and expenditures incurred pursuant to the emergency
declaration during the period May 2000 through October 2000.  Additional
information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons
(CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent annual
Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant
to section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the "Nonproliferation
Report," and the most recent annual report provided to the Congress
pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the
"CBW Report."

On July 28, 1998, in Executive Order 13094, I amended section 4 of
Executive Order 12938 so that the United States Government could more
effectively respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass destruction
proliferation activities.  The amendment of section 4 strengthens Executive
Order 12938 in several significant ways.  The amendment broadens the type
of pro-liferation activity that can subject entities to potential penalties
under the Executive Order.  The original Executive Order provided for
penalties for contributions to the efforts of any foreign country, project
or entity to use, acquire, design, produce or stockpile chemical or
biological weapons; the amended Executive Order also covers contributions
to foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for missiles capable of
delivering weapons of mass destruction.  Moreover, the amendment expands
the original Executive Order to include attempts to contribute to foreign
proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions, and broadens the
range of potential penalties to include expressly the prohibition of United
States Government assistance to foreign persons, and the prohibition of
imports into the United States and United States Government procurement.
In sum, the amendment gives the United States Government greater
flexibility in deciding how and to what extent to impose measures against
foreign persons that assist proliferation programs.

Nuclear Weapons

In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear tests
that brought their nuclear weapon programs out in the open, in defiance of
decades of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Since that time, they have continued production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons and have flight-tested ballistic nuclear-capable missiles.
World reaction to these developments included nearly universal condemnation
across a broad range of international fora.  The United States and a number
of other countries respectively imposed sanctions and other unilateral
measures.  The G-8 agreed to new restrictions on lending by international
financial institutions.

Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions, we have worked
unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, with the South Asia Task
Force, and through the United Nations to urge India and Pakistan to move
toward the international nonproliferation mainstream.

We have supported calls by the P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security Council on India
and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete actions designed to prevent
a costly and destabilizing nuclear arms and missile race, with possible
implications beyond the region.  The United States has focused most
intensely on several objectives that can be met over the short and medium
term:  an end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional adherence by
India and Pakistan to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT);
constructive engagement in negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT) and, pending its conclusion, a moratorium on production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint
in the development of nuclear-capable missiles, as well as their
nondeployment; and adoption of controls meeting international standards on
exports of sensitive materials and technology.

Against a backdrop of international pressure on India and Pakistan,
intensive high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and Pakistani officials
have yielded only modest progress, principally on export controls.  In
September 1998, Indian and Pakistani leaders, noting that their countries
had already declared testing moratoria, expressed to the U.N. General
Assembly a willingness to sign the CTBT by September 1999 under certain
conditions.  Subsequent developments including the Indian election, the
Kargil conflict, the October coup in Pakistan, and the U.S. Senate's vote
against providing its advice and consent to CTBT ratification further
complicated the issue during 1999, although neither country renounced its
commitment.  Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced during his visit to
Washington in September 2000 that India would maintain its moratorium until
CTBT entered into force.  Both governments have said they would work to
build domestic consensus for CTBT signature, without which they could not
sign.  Such consensus has not been achieved and, consequently, neither
country has signed the CTBT thus far.

India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to negotiations on an
FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on Disarma-ment session,
and negotiations got underway for a brief time.  However, these
negotiations were unable to resume in 1999 or 2000 due to a deadlock over
the negotiating mandate.

Some progress was achieved in bringing Indian and Pakistani export controls
into closer conformity with international standards.  India recently
instituted new, more specific regulations on many categories of sensitive
nonnuclear equipment and technology and has said that nuclear-related
regulations will be forthcoming.  Pakistan has publicly announced
regulations restricting nuclear exports and has indicated that further
measures are being prepared.  However, both countries' steps still fall
well short of international standards.  We have begun with India a program
of technical cooperation designed to improve the effectiveness of its
already extensive export controls, and encourage further steps to bring
India's controls in line with international standards.  Similar assistance
to Pakistan is prohibited by coup-related sanctions.

The summer 1999 Kargil conflict and the October 1999 military takeover in
Pakistan resulted in the suspension of the Indo-Pakistani bilateral
dialogue begun at Lahore.  Tensions remain high, particularly over
insurgent attacks in Kashmir, and there are no encouraging signs that talks
will resume soon.

We have agreed to continue regular discussions with India at the senior and
expert levels, and will also remain engaged with Pakistan, as appropriate.
Our diplomatic efforts, in concert with the P-5, G-8, and in international
fora, will also continue.

I discussed these issues with the Governments of India and Pakistan during
my trip there in March 2000 and with Prime Minister Vajpayee when he came
to Washington this September.  With India, we have stressed that our
relationship will not be able to reach its full potential without progress
on our nonproliferation and regional security concerns.  With Pakistan, we
also emphasized the importance of progress on regional security and
nonproliferation, among other pressing issues.

In October 1994, the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK or North Korea) signed an Agreed Framework which, if fully
implemented, will ultimately result in the complete cessation of the DPRK's
nuclear weapon-related program and its full compliance with the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  As a first step, North Korea froze
construction and operations at its Yongbyon and Taechon nuclear facilities.
The freeze remains in place, and to monitor the freeze, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has maintained a continuous presence at the
Yongbyon site since 1994.  The U.S. spent fuel team completed canning of
the accessible spent fuel rods and rod fragments from the North?s
5-megawatt nuclear reactor in April 2000.  The IAEA has confirmed that the
remaining few rod fragments that are currently inaccessible do not
represent a proliferation concern, and the Agency continues
to monitor the canned fuel.  The U.S. spent-fuel team returned to the DPRK
in October 2000 to continue clean-up and canning at Yongbyon, and to begin
looking at long-term maintenance.

Serious U.S. suspicions about an underground facility at Kumchang-ni led
the United States to raise its concerns directly with Pyongyang and to
negotiate access to the site as long as U.S. concerns remain.  In May 1999,
a Department of State-led team of experts visited the site and judged it,
as then configured, not suited to house plutonium production reactors or
reprocessing operations.  Based on the data gathered by the U.S. team and
the subsequent technical review, the United States concluded that the
activities were not a violation of the Agreed
Framework.  A second Department of State-led team conducted a visit in May
2000 and found no evidence to contradict the 1999 assessment.  In light of
a final review of these results, the joint communique issued following the
visit of DPRK Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok to Washington stated that "U.S.
concerns" about the underground site at Kumchang-ni had been "removed."

While the Kumchang-ni visit addressed some of our nonproliferation
concerns, future negotiations with the North will seek to discuss ways to
allay all of them -- in the context of assuring full implementation of the
Agreed Framework and improving overall relations.  In May and July 2000,
the United States and DPRK held rounds of talks concerning Agreed Framework
implementation and the DPRK's missile program, respectively.  Another round
of talks, which included discussion on terrorism issues, was held in New
York from September 27 to October 2 of this year.  During the talks, the
DPRK informed us that DPRK Special Envoy Marshal Jo Myong Rok would visit
Washington from October 9 to 12, 2000.  The joint communique released at
the end of that historic visit noted that both countries "are prepared to
undertake a new direction in their relations."  Toward that end, the two
stated that "neither government would have hostile intent toward the
other."  Both sides pledged to "redouble their commitment and their efforts
to fulfill their respective obligations in their entirety under the Agreed
Framework."  The DPRK also reaffirmed its ballistic missile flight test
moratorium, and agreed that "there are a variety of available means,
including the Four Party talks, to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula
and formally end the Korean War by replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreement
with permanent peace arrangements."

The NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
In May 2000, NPT Parties met in New York for the 2000 NPT Review Conference
(REVCON).  Despite predictions to the contrary, the 158 participating
nations adopted by consensus a Final Document that reviews NPT
imple-mentation over the past 5 years and establishes a program of action
for the future.  This is the first NPT Review Conference to achieve such a
Final Document since 1985.  The Conference met or exceeded all U.S.
objectives.  It provided an important boost to the NPT and to nuclear
nonproliferation goals in general.

The IAEA verifies states? compliance with their NPT obligations by means of
its safeguards system.  The discovery at the time of the Gulf War of Iraq?s
extensive covert nuclear activities led to an international consensus in
favor of strengthening the IAEA safeguards system?s ability to detect
undeclared nuclear material and activities.  The United States and a large
number of like-minded states negotiated in the mid-1990s substantial
strengthening measures, including the use of environmental sampling
techniques, expansion of the classes of nuclear activities states are
required to declare, and expansion of IAEA access rights.  Measures
requiring additional legal authority are embodied in a Model Additional
Protocol approved in 1997.  This Protocol has now been signed by 54 states
and has entered into force for 14.  Provided the IAEA is given the
resources and political support it needs to implement its new safeguards
measures effectively, proliferators will now find it much harder to evade
the system.

The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty on
September 24, 1996.  As of early October 2000, 160 countries have signed
and 65 have ratified the CTBT, including 30 of the 44 countries required by
the Treaty for its entry into force.  During 2000, CTBT signatories
conducted numerous meetings of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) and its
subsidiary bodies in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid completion of the
International Monitoring System (IMS) established by the Treaty.

On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, requesting
prompt advice and consent to ratification.  I deeply regret the Senate?s
decision on October 13, 1999, to refuse to provide its advice and consent
to ratify the CTBT.  The CTBT will serve several United States national
security interests by prohibiting all nuclear explosions.  It will
constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons;
make the development of advanced new types of weapons much more difficult;
contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of
nuclear disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security.  The
CTBT marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat
and to build a safer world.  For these reasons, we hope that at an
appropriate time, the Senate will reconsider this treaty.

The purpose of the 35-nation Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Exporters
(Zangger) Committee is to harmonize implemen-tation of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty?s requirement to apply Inter-national Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards to nuclear exports.  Article III.2 of the Treaty
requires parties to ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports to
nonnuclear weapon states of (a) source or special fissionable material, or
(b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the
processing, use or production of special fissionable material.  The
Committee maintains and updates a list (the "Trigger List") of equipment
that may only be exported if safeguards are applied to the recipient
facility.  The relative informality of the Zangger Committee has enabled it
to take the lead on certain nonprolifera-tion issues that would be more
difficult to resolve in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

At its March 2000 meeting, the Committee approved the Chairman?s report of
Committee activities to the 2000 NPT REVCON.  The Committee also agreed to
continue consideration of possible future adoption of the full-scope
safeguards (FSS) policy.  The Committee also agreed to an informal meeting
with IAEA staff to discuss procedures for keeping the Agency informed on
Trigger List changes and the rationale for such changes, since the Agency
uses the Zangger Trigger List as a reference document.  A separate working
group, chaired by Sweden, is considering the addition of plutonium
enrichment equipment to the Trigger List.

During the past year, two new members have joined the Zangger Committee --
Turkey in October 1999 and Slovenia in March 2000.

All of the nuclear weapon states, including China, are members of the
Zangger Committee.  However, unlike all of the other nuclear weapon states
members of the Zangger Committee, China is not a member of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), which requires its members to adhere to a FSS policy
of requiring non-nuclear weapon states to accept IAEA safeguards on all of
its nuclear facilities as a condition of supply to those states.  China has
been reluctant to agree to this policy.

With 38 member states, the NSG is a widely accepted and effective
export-control arrangement, which contributes to the nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons through implementation of guidelines for control of nuclear
and nuclear-related exports.  Members pursue the aims of the NSG through
adherence to the Guidelines, which are adopted by consensus, and through
exchanges of information on developments of nuclear proliferation concern.

Turkey, Belarus, and Cyprus became the newest members of the NSG in May 19,
2000.  Slovenia was invited to participate as an observer at the 2000 Paris
Plenary and has applied for NSG membership this year.  NSG members often
agree to allow non-member nations deemed eligible for NSG membership to
participate in Plenary meetings as observers.  While not an NSG member,
China has taken a major step toward harmonization of its export control
system with the NSG Part 2 Guidelines by the implementation of controls
over nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material, and related technology.

In May 2000, the NSG Troika (composed of the past, present, and future NSG
Chairs -- in this case Britain, Italy and France) met with representatives
of the Iranian Government to discuss Iranian criticism of the NSG.  The
meeting of the Troika followed up
earlier meetings by the Italian Chair in Tehran and on the margins of the
1999 NSG Transparency Seminar in New York.  The Troika urged Iran to sign
the additional protocol with the IAEA that strengthens safeguards.  Iranian
officials offered to provide additional confidence-building measures to
facilitate nuclear exports from NSG members.  The United States, as the
future plenary chair, intends to be an active participant in all NSG Troika
activities in the coming years, though any involvement in Troika contacts
with Iran will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis prior to the
meetings.  The United States does not believe that the ongoing discussions
with Iran can or should soften supplier attitudes.

During the Plenary meetings in Paris in June 2000, the Czech Republic
presented information on its new legislation intended to halt all tangible
and intangible supply to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran.  The
Czech delegation stated that the new legislation covers direct transfers to
Bushehr, as well as indirect support through a third party.  The Italian
NSG Chair presented a report of NSG activities at the 2000 NPT Review

Chemical and Biological Weapons

The export control regulations issued under the Expanded Proliferation
Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and continue to be
administered by the Department of Commerce, in consultation with other
agencies, in order to control the export of items with potential use in
chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of
mass destruction.

Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our
security and that of our allies.  On April 29, 1997, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC)
entered into force with 87 of the CWC?s 165 States Signatories as original
States Parties, including the United States, which ratified on April 25,
1997.  Russia ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997, and became a State
Party on December 8, 1997.  As of October 30, 2000, 140 countries will have
become States Parties.

The implementing body for the CWC -- the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) -- was established on April 29, 1997.  The OPCW,
located in The Hague is comprised of States Parties and international civil
servants that are responsible for implementing the CWC.  It consists of the
Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical
Secretariat (TS).  The TS carries out the verification
provisions of the CWC, and presently has a staff of approximately 500,
including about 200 inspectors trained and equipped to inspect military and
industrial facilities throughout the world.  As of October 30, 2000, the
OPCW has conducted over 790 routine inspections in some 37 countries.  No
challenge inspections have yet taken place.  The OPCW maintains a permanent
inspector presence at operational U.S. CW destruction facilities in Utah,
on Johnston Island, and elsewhere.  Accordingly, approximately 70 percent
of the inspection days currently have been at U.S. declared facilities.

The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the concrete
measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for states or
other entities attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related activities.
Receiving accurate and complete declarations from all States Parties will
improve our knowledge of possible chemical weapons-related activities.  Its
inspection provisions provide for access by international inspectors to
declared and potentially undeclared facilities and locations, thus making
clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more difficult,
more risky, and more expensive.

The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was enacted into
U.S. law on October 21, 1998, as part of the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law
105-277).  -I issued Executive Order 13128 on June 25, 1999, to facilitate
implementation of the Act and the Convention, and published regulations on
December 30, 1999, regarding declarations and inspections of industrial
facilities.  The United States commenced its submission of industry
declarations at the end of April 2000, and hosted its first industry
inspection on May 8, 2000.  Industry inspections are proceeding well.  Our
submission of the industry declarations to the OPCW and commencement of
inspections, has strengthened U.S. leadership in the organization as well
as our ability to encourage other States Parties to make complete,
accurate, and timely declarations.

Countries that refuse to join the CWC have been isolated politically and
denied access by the CWC to certain key chemicals from States Parties.  The
relevant treaty provisions are specifically designed to penalize countries
that refuse to join the rest of the world in eliminating the threat of
chemical weapons.

The United States also continues to play an active role in the
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons (BW).  We
participate in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of States Parties of the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
(the Biological Weapons Convention or BWC).  The AHG is striving to
complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen the 1972 Convention to
promote compliance and enhance transparency.  This Ad Hoc Group was
mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference.  The Fourth BWC
Review Conference (November/December 1996) urged the AHG to complete the
protocol as soon as possible before the next BWC Review Conference in 2001.
Work is progressing on a draft text through discussion of national views
and clarification of existing text.  Differences in national views persist
concerning such substantive areas as on-site activities, export controls,
declarations, and technical assistance provisions.  The United States
remains strongly committed to the objective agreed to in the 1996 Review
Conference, but will only accept a protocol that enhances U.S. security and
strengthens national and international efforts to address the BW threat.

I announced in my 1998 State of the Union Address that the United States
would take a leading role in the effort to erect stronger international
barriers against the proliferation and use of BW by strengthening the BWC
with a new international means to detect and deter cheating.  We are
working closely with industry representatives to obtain technical input
relevant to the development of U.S. negotiating positions and then to reach
international agreement on protocol provisions.

The United States continues to be a leading participant in the 32-member
Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation
regime.  The United States attended the most recent annual AG Plenary
Session from October 2-5, 2000, during which the Group reaffirmed the
members? continued collective belief in the AG?s viability, importance, and
compatibility with the CWC and BWC.  Members continue to agree that full
adherence to the CWC and BWC by all governments will be the only way to
achieve a permanent global ban on chemical and biological weapons, and that
all states adhering to these Conventions must take steps to ensure that
their national activities support these goals.  At the 2000 Plenary, the
Group welcomed its newest members, Cyprus and Turkey.  At this year's
plenary, the regime continued to focus on strengthening and refining AG
export controls and sharing information to address the CBW threat,
especially from terrorism.  The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to
continue its active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries, and
to promote regional consultations on export controls and nonproliferation
to further awareness and under-standing of national policies in these
areas.  The AG discussed ways to be more proactive in stemming attacks on
the AG in the CWC and BWC contexts.

During the last 6 months, we continued to examine intelligence and other
information of trade in CBW-related material and technology that might be
relevant to sanctions provisions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991.  No new sanctions
determinations were reached during this reporting period.  The United
States also continues to cooperate with its AG partners and other countries
in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.

Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The United States continues carefully to control exports that could
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction,
and closely to monitor activities of potential missile proliferation
concern.  We also continue to implement U.S. missile sanctions laws.  In
April 2000, we imposed sanctions against a North Korean entity and four
Iranian entities for missile proliferation activities.  These sanctions
followed March 1999 missile sanctions against three Middle Eastern

During this reporting period, the 32 Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) Partners (members) continued to share information about
proliferation problems with each other and with other potential supplier,
consumer, and transshipment states.  Partners also emphasized the need for
implementing effective export control systems.  This cooperation has
resulted in the interdic-tion of missile-related materials intended for use
in missile programs of concern.

In March and September 2000, the United States participated in two MTCR
Reinforced Point of Contact Meetings (RPOC).  At the RPOCs, MTCR Partners
continued their discussions on new ways to better address the global
missile proliferation threat.  They also undertook to develop a new
multilateral mechanism on missile nonproliferation.  This mechanism is
intended to complement the important work of the MTCR and eventually to
include the participation of both MTCR and non-MTCR countries.

The MTCR Partners held their annual plenary meeting in Helsinki, on October
9-13, 2000.  The Partners took decisions concerning the substance of a new
multilateral mechanism on missile non-proliferation and ways to take it
forward.  They also discussed cooperation on halting shipments of missile
proliferation concern and exchanged information about activities of missile
prolifera-tion concern worldwide, including in South Asia, Northeast Asia,
and the Middle East.

During this reporting period, the United States continued to work
unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat missile
proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly and to
adhere to the MTCR Guidelines.  Since my last report, we continued our
missile nonproliferation dialogues with
China, India, the Republic of Korea, and North Korea, and have raised this
issue with Pakistan at senior levels.  Although regular discussions with
Pakistan at the expert level have not proceeded since the fall 1999 coup,
we remain engaged at the diplomatic level, and I addressed our
nonproliferation concerns during my visit to Pakistan in March of this
year.  In the course of normal diplomatic relations we also have pursued
such discussions with other countries in Central Europe, South Asia, and
the Middle East.

In July 2000, the United States and the DPRK held a fifth round of missile
talks in Kuala Lumpur.  This was the first round of talks after a 16-month
hiatus.  It provided a useful opportunity to assess developments since the
March 1999 talks in Pyongyang, including the DPRK's June 2000 reaffirmation
of its moratorium on flight tests of long-range missiles of any kind.  The
United States discussed its continuing concerns about North Korea?s missile
activities and again pressed for tight constraints on DPRK missile
development, testing, and exports.  Both sides agreed to hold another round
of talks as soon as possible, and a sixth round occurred September 28-29 in
New York.  The United States continued to urge the DPRK to take steps to
address U.S. and international concerns about the DPRK's indigenous missile
programs and its missile-related activities.  The United States also
discussed Chairman Kim Jong-Il's idea, suggested to Russian President Putin
in mid-July, of trading missile restraints for launches of DPRK satellites
on foreign launchers.  During the October visit to Washington of DPRK
Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok, the United States and DPRK agreed that
"resolution of the missile issue would make an essential contribution to a
fundamentally improved relationship between them and to peace and security
in the Asia-Pacific region."  The DPRK also reaffirmed its ballistic

missile flight test moratorium "while talks on the missile issue continue."

Secretary Albright met with Chairman Kim Jong-Il in Pyongyang October
23-24.  They had serious, constructive, and in-depth discussions on the
full range of U.S. concerns on missiles, including both the DPRK's
indigenous missile programs and exports.  They also explored Chairman Kim's
idea of restraining DPRK missile capabilities in exchange for launches of
DPRK satellites on foreign boosters.  U.S. and DPRK missile experts are
scheduled to continue discussions in early November.

In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire sensitive
items from Russian entities for use in Iran?s missile and nuclear
development programs, the United States is pursuing a high-level dialogue
with Russia aimed at finding ways to work together to cut off the flow of
sensitive goods to Iran?s ballistic missile development program and its
nuclear weapon program.  Russia?s government has created institutional
founda-tions to implement a newly enacted nonproliferation policy and
passed laws to punish wrongdoers.  It also has passed new export control
legislation to tighten government control over sensitive technologies and
continued working with the United States to strengthen export control
practices at Russian aerospace firms.  However, despite the Russian
government?s nonproliferation and export control efforts, some Russian
entities continued to cooperate with Iran?s ballistic missile program and
to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond the Bushehr Unit 1
nuclear power reactor project, which could further Iran?s nuclear weapon

Consistent with the Russian government's April 2000 announcement of
administrative action against the Rector of the Baltic State Technical
University (BSTU) for his involvement in training Iranian specialists at
BSTU, and following our own assessment, the United States announced on
April 24, 2000, plans to impose trade and administrative penalties on the
Rector for his involve-ment with the Iranian missile program.  At the same
time, the
United States also announced its intention to remove restrictions imposed
in July 1998 on two Russian entities -- INOR and Polyus -- which have
ceased the proliferation behavior that led to the imposition of penalties.
However, penalties imposed in July 1998 against five other Russian entities
and in January 1999 against three additional entities remain in effect.

Value of Nonproliferation Export Controls

The U.S. national export controls -- both those implemented pursuant to
multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those implemented unilaterally --
play an important part in impeding the proliferation of WMD and missiles.
(As used here, "export controls" refer to requirements for case-by-case
review of certain exports, or limitations on exports of particular items of
proliferation concern to certain destinations, rather than broad embargoes
or economic sanctions that also affect trade.)  As noted in this report,
however, export controls are only one of a number of tools the United
States uses to achieve its nonproliferation objectives.  Global
nonproliferation treaties and norms, multilateral nonproliferation regimes,
interdictions of shipments of proliferation concern, sanctions, export
control assistance, redirection and elimination efforts, and robust U.S.
military, intelligence, and diplomatic capabilities all work in conjunction
with export controls as part of our overall nonproliferation strategy.

Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation because every
emerging WMD/missile program seeks equipment and technology from other
countries.  Proliferators look to other sources because needed items are
unavailable within their country, because indigenously produced items are
of substandard quality or insufficient quantity, and/or because imported
items can be obtained more quickly and cheaply than domestically produced
ones.  It is important to note that proliferators seek for their WMD and
missile programs both items on multilateral lists (like gyroscopes
controlled on the MTCR Annex and nerve gas precursors on the Australia
Group list) and unlisted items (like lower-level machine tools and very
basic chemicals).  In addition, many of the items of interest to
proliferators are inherently dual-use.  For example, key precursors and
technologies used in the production of fertilizers or pesticides also can
be used to make chemical weapons; bio-production technology can be used to
produce biological weapons.

The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or denying
proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or technology for use in
their WMD/missile programs.  In large part, U.S. national export controls
-- and similar controls of our partners in the Australia Group, Missile
Technology Control Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group -- have denied
proliferators access to the largest sources of the best equipment and
technology.  Proliferators have mostly been forced to seek less capable
items from nonregime suppliers.  Moreover, in many instances, U.S. and
regime controls and associated efforts have forced proliferators to engage
in complex clandestine procurements even from nonmember suppliers, taking
time and money away from WMD/missile programs.

The U.S. national export controls and those of our regime partners also
have played an important role, increasing over time the critical mass of
countries applying nonproliferation export controls.  For example:  the
7-member MTCR of 1987 has grown to 32 member countries; the NSG adopted
full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply and extended new controls to
nuclear-related dual-use items; several nonmember countries have committed
unilaterally to apply export controls consistent with one or more of the
regimes; and most of the members of the nonproliferation regimes have
applied national "catch-all" controls similar to those under the U.S.
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative.  (Export controls normally are
tied to a specific list of items, such as the MTCR Annex.  "Catch-all"
controls provide a legal basis to control exports of items not on a list,
when those items are destined for WMD/missile programs.)  The United States
maintains a global program, funded by the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining and Related Activities account, to assist other countries' efforts
to strengthen their export control systems.  A principal focus of this
important effort is Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS), where we
also employ funds provided under the Freedom Support Act.

The U.S. export controls, especially "catch-all" controls, also make
important political and moral contributions to the nonpro-liferation
effort.  They uphold the broad legal obligations the United States has
undertaken in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Article I), Biological
Weapons Convention (Article III), and Chemical Weapons Convention (Article
I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD activities.  They endeavor to
assure there are no U.S. "fingerprints" on WMD and missiles that threaten
U.S. citizens and territory and our friends and interests overseas.  They
place the United States squarely and unambiguously against WMD/missile
proliferation, even against the prospect of inadvertent proliferation from
the United States itself.

Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling and enhancing
legitimate trade.  They provide a means to permit dual-use exports to
proceed under circumstances where, without export control scrutiny, the
only prudent course would be to prohibit them.  They help build confidence
between countries applying similar controls that, in turn, results in
increased trade.  Each of the WMD nonproliferation regimes, for example,
has a "no undercut" policy committing each member not to make an export
that another has denied for nonproliferation reasons and notified to the
rest -- unless it first consults with the original denying country.  Not
only does this policy make it more difficult for proliferators to get items
from regime members, it establishes a "level playing field" for exporters.

Threat Reduction

The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system expertise has
increased in part as a consequence of the economic crisis in Russia and
other Newly Independent States (NIS).  My Administration gives high
priority to controlling the human dimension of proliferation through
programs that support the transition of former Soviet weapons scientists to
civilian research and technology development activities.  I have proposed
an additional $4.5 billion for programs embodied in the Expanded Threat
Reduction Initiative (ETRI) that would support activities in four areas
over FYs 2000-2004:  nuclear security; nonnuclear
WMD; science and technology nonproliferation; and military relocation,
stabilization and other security cooperation programs.  Of the $1 billion
Congressional ETRI request for FY 2000, an estimated $888 million is
available:  State ($182 million), Energy ($293 million), and Defense ($467
million).  We are seeking $974 million in FY 2001.


Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641
(c)), I report that there were no specific expenses directly attributable
to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration of the national
emergency in Executive Order 12938, as amended, during the period from May
16, 2000, through November 12, 2000.


                               WILLIAM J. CLINTON

                                 # # #

President and First Lady | Vice President and Mrs. Gore
Record of Progress | The Briefing Room
Gateway to Government | Contacting the White House
White House for Kids | White House History
White House Tours | Help | Text Only

Privacy Statement