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The Administration shares with Congress a commitment to ensuring the
American people are provided effective protection against the emerging
long-range missile threat from rogue nations. That is why we have since
1996 diligently pursued a deployment readiness program to develop a limited
National Missile Defense (NMD) system designed to protect against such
threats. The Administration has budgeted $10.5 billion between fiscal
years 1999-2005 for this program, including the funds that would be
necessary during this period to deploy a limited NMD.
The Administration strongly opposes S. 257 because it suggests that our
decision on deploying an NMD system should be based solely on a
determination that the system is "technologically possible." This
unacceptably narrow definition would ignore other critical factors that the
Administration believes must be addressed when it considers the deployment
question in 2000, including those that must be evaluated by the President
as Commander-in-Chief. If S. 257 were presented to the President in its
current form, the President's senior national security advisors would
recommend that the bill be vetoed.
The Administration intends to base the deployment decision on an assessment
of the technology (based on an initial series of rigorous flight-tests) and
the proposed system's operational effectiveness. In addition, the
President and his senior advisors will need both to confirm whether the
rogue state ballistic missile threat to the United States has developed as
quickly as is currently expected and to re-evaluate the cost of deploying
an NMD system.
A decision regarding NMD deployment must also be addressed within the
context of the ABM Treaty and our objectives for achieving future
reductions in strategic offensive arms through START II and START III. The
ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability, and Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin agree that it is of fundamental significance to
achieving the elimination of thousands of strategic nuclear arms under
these treaties.
The Administration has made clear to Russia that deployment of a limited
NMD that requires amendments to the ABM Treaty would not be incompatible
with the underlying purpose of the ABM Treaty, i.e., to maintain strategic
stability and enable further reductions in strategic nuclear arms. The ABM
Treaty has been amended before, and the Administration sees no reason why
it should not be possible to modify it again to permit deployment of an NMD
effective against rogue nation missile threats.
No other nation shall have a veto over the United States' NMD requirements.
America's sovereign rights are fully protected by the supreme national
interest clause that is an integral part of the ABM Treaty. The
Administration, however, does not believe it should issue ultimatums and
stands ready to negotiate any necessary amendments to the treaty in good
faith.
S. 257 suggests that neither the ABM Treaty nor the objectives for START II
and START III are factors in an NMD deployment decision. Enactment of this
legislation would clearly be interpreted by Russia as evidence that the
U.S. is not interested in working towards a cooperative solution, one that
is in both nations' security interests. This would put at risk a
successful negotiation on the ABM Treaty and the hard-won bipartisan gains
of START. Our common goal should be to achieve success in negotiations on
the ABM Treaty while also securing the strategic arms reductions available
through START.
The Administration urges the Senate to modify S. 257 to allow a deployment
decision to be based on criteria other than just technical feasibility and
to reflect the priority that must be attached to these ABM and START
objectives.
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